there's a pretty large gap between the game theorists and everybody else. "practical" people consider game theory to be too woolly for everyday use. outside of economics, game theorists often have trouble talking the talk well enuf for anybody to take them seriously.
soldiers, unfortunately, are generally pretty bad at viewing war as game-playing. current bleeding-edge training for officers is to consider the consequences of their actions beyond merely blowing up the enemy real good (israeli and british counter-insurgency doctrine, which we're slowly learning from them).
if i know anything about how game theory relates to warfare, it's from scattered lectures and articles, with occasional book chapters thrown in. for example, in kahn's the codebreakers there's a short discussion of our decision to shoot down yamamoto's plane, having decoded his itinerary. our generals used very early game theory to analyze possible japanese responses (who would take over from him; would they realize we'd broken their codes and switch to more secure ones) and our counters to those, and concluded that a) the japanese lacked a good replacement and b) even if they immediately started to use unbreakable codes, we'd be better off having killed yamamoto.
i'll page thru the bibilography of leonhard's maneuver warfare and see if he's cited anything with an obvious title. (he's an interesting war theorist, having commanded one of the divisions in operation desert manhood 1.)
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timeasmymeasure
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Date: 2006-04-13 08:50 pm (UTC)there's a pretty large gap between the game theorists and everybody else. "practical" people consider game theory to be too woolly for everyday use. outside of economics, game theorists often have trouble talking the talk well enuf for anybody to take them seriously.
soldiers, unfortunately, are generally pretty bad at viewing war as game-playing. current bleeding-edge training for officers is to consider the consequences of their actions beyond merely blowing up the enemy real good (israeli and british counter-insurgency doctrine, which we're slowly learning from them).
if i know anything about how game theory relates to warfare, it's from scattered lectures and articles, with occasional book chapters thrown in. for example, in kahn's the codebreakers there's a short discussion of our decision to shoot down yamamoto's plane, having decoded his itinerary. our generals used very early game theory to analyze possible japanese responses (who would take over from him; would they realize we'd broken their codes and switch to more secure ones) and our counters to those, and concluded that a) the japanese lacked a good replacement and b) even if they immediately started to use unbreakable codes, we'd be better off having killed yamamoto.
i'll page thru the bibilography of leonhard's maneuver warfare and see if he's cited anything with an obvious title. (he's an interesting war theorist, having commanded one of the divisions in operation desert manhood 1.)